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Racing Against the ASFA Clock: How Incarcerated
Parents Lose More Than Freedom
I. INTRODUCTION
The Adoption and Safe Families Act (hereinafter "ASFA") was
signed into federal law by President Bill Clinton in 1997.1 ASFA's
primary goal is to reduce the length of time children spend in fos-
ter care by expediting the route to permanency, preferably
through adoption. 2 In order for a child to be adopted, however,
the parental rights of both the mother and father must be termi-
nated. ASFA facilitates this process by mandating the com-
mencement of termination proceedings after a child has been in
foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months (here-
inafter "15/22 provision"). 3
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
the fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care, custody
and management of their children.4 Because of the "irreversible"
and "irretrievably destructive" nature of termination proceedings,
ASFA's 15/22 provision seriously threatens one of our most per-
sonally and constitutionally important rights. 5 This comment will
explore the impact of ASFA's 15/22 provision on a particularly
vulnerable subgroup of American citizens: incarcerated parents.
After introducing the history, relevant portions and various state
implementations of ASFA, this comment will address the nature
of ASFA's "punishment" of incarcerated parents by discussing the
interplay between the 15/22 provision and standard state grounds
for parental rights termination. Further, this comment will dem-
onstrate the disproportionate effects of the 15/22 provision on fe-
male and minority prisoners. Finally, suggestions for possible leg-
islative, judicial and social remedies will be proposed.
1. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000)).
2. ASFA's stated purpose is "to promote the adoption of children in foster care." 111
Stat. at 2115.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (2000).
4. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745
(1982).
5. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 118, 121.
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A. The Legislative Shift from Family Reunification to Adoption
ASFA's predecessor, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980 (hereinafter "AACWA"), encompassed a decidedly dif-
ferent approach towards securing permanency for children in the
social welfare system. 6 Specifically, AACWA required that "rea-
sonable efforts ... be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in
foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the
child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to
return to his home .... ,,7 Thus, AACWA favored reunification of
the family whenever possible and provided federal funding as an
incentive for state agencies to effectuate this goal.8
Between 1985 and 1995, however, the number of children in the
foster care system nearly doubled. 9 As a result of this alleged fail-
ure of the reunification strategy, legislators began to push for re-
form. Thus, ASFA was born, substantially replacing AACWA on
November 19, 1997.10
ASFA seeks to cure the problem of "foster care drift" by shifting
the focus of permanency planning to adoption, rather than reunifi-
cation.11 ASFA accomplishes this goal by financially reimbursing
a state's child welfare system based on the number of adoptions
achieved, but only if the state has enacted ASFA-complying legis-
lation. 12 ASFA also significantly amends AACWA by no longer
requiring reasonable reunification efforts if (1) the parent has
committed one of a specified number of violent crimes against any
other of the parent's children, (2) the parent has subjected the
child at issue to certain "aggravating circumstances," including
abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, or sexual abuse, or (3) the
6. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat.
500 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
7. 94 Stat. at 503.
8. Amy Wilkinson-Hagen, The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997: A Collision of
Parens Patriae and Parents' Constitutional Rights, 11 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 137,
143 (2004).
9. Sally Day, Mothers in Prison: How the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997
Threatens Parental Rights, 20 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 220 (2005). Contributing factors to
the increase of children in foster care may have included welfare reform legislation and the
rise of crack-cocaine use. Id.
10. Id. at 221.
11. "Foster care drift" refers to "the problem of children entering the system and mov-
ing from foster home to foster home without any clear goals of permanency." Wilkinson-
Hagen, supra note 8, at 142.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 673b (2000). Incentive funding for family reunification is no longer
offered. See Antoinette Greenaway, When Neutral Policies Aren't So Neutral: Increasing
Incarceration Rates and the Effect of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 on the
Parental Rights of African-American Women, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 247, 257 (2004).
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parent's rights have been involuntarily terminated as to any other
children.13 Moreover, where no reasonable efforts are required,
termination proceedings must take place within thirty days of the
child's removal from the home. 14 Finally, in all cases, a perma-
nency hearing must be held within twelve months after the child's
entry into foster care for the purpose of determining the state's
permanency plan. 15
The most drastic change, however, comes in the form of ASFA's
15/22 provision, which requires a state agency to file a petition to
terminate parental rights after a child has been in foster care for
fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months, 16 unless (1) the
child is being cared for by a fit and willing relative, (2) the state
agency has documented a compelling reason why parental rights
should not be terminated' 7 or (3) the state agency has not pro-
vided the family with the services necessary to achieve safe reuni-
fication.' 8 It is important to note, however, that these exceptions
are merely suggested, rather than mandated, and their enactment
rests in the discretion of the states.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i)-(iii) (2000). Such violent crimes include murder; volun-
tary manslaughter; aiding and abetting, soliciting, conspiring or attempting to commit
murder or voluntary manslaughter; and felony assault that results in serious bodily injury.
42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(ii)(I)-(IV).
14. Id. at § 671(a)(15)(E)(i).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (2000).
16. Note that the 15/22 provision triggers only the filing of a petition to terminate pa-
rental rights and does not constitute an independent basis for termination. In all states,
the petitioning agency must still prove by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for
termination, as defined by state law, exist. Typical grounds for termination include aban-
donment, permanent neglect or abuse. Only six states, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ne-
braska, Oklahoma and South Carolina, have attempted to establish the mere placement of
a child in foster care for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months as an independent
ground for termination; however, Illinois' Supreme Court held this approach unconstitu-
tional in In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001). See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
50/1(D)(m-1) (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (West 2000); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 625.090(2)j) (LexisNexis 2000) (In Kentucky, however, grounds for termination are
not the only consideration; rather, the court must also find either that the child has been
abused or neglected or that the parent has been convicted of abusing or neglecting another
child.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292(7) (LexisNexis 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §
7006-1.1(a)(15) (West Supp. 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(8) (2000).
17. The Code of Federal Regulations indicates that such compelling reasons may in-
clude, but are not limited to: cases in which adoption is not the appropriate permanency
goal for the child; no grounds exist to terminate parental rights; the child is an unaccompa-
nied minor refugee; or there are international legal obligations or compelling foreign policy
reasons against terminating parental rights. 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(i)(2)(ii) (2000).
18. Such services may include counseling, visitation assistance and referrals to mental
health, domestic violence or drug treatment programs. Day, supra note 9, at 221.
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B. The Incorporation of ASFA into the Juvenile Laws of Pennsyl-
vania and Other States
Since the passage of ASFA, all states have amended their child
welfare laws to varying degrees. At least thirty-two states have
adopted two or more of the federally permitted exceptions to the
15/22 provision; some include slight, but meaningful, differences
in language, while others mirror ASFA's statutory text. 19 Addi-
tionally, several states have set forth specific "compelling reasons"
for avoiding the commencement of termination proceedings after
fifteen months, while others have left this exception undefined.
20
In New York, for example, compelling reasons may include the
lack of sufficient grounds for filing a termination petition or the
child's opposition to adoption if he is over fourteen years old.
21
Regarding parental incarceration, at least two states, Colorado
and Nebraska, consider it a mitigating factor with respect to the
15/22 provision, while at least four others have gone the opposite
route and deemed it, with varying nuances, an aggravating cir-
cumstance under which reasonable efforts are no longer re-
quired. 2
2
Pennsylvania modified its Juvenile Act to comply with ASFA in
1998.23 The Commonwealth requires child welfare agencies to
engage in reasonable efforts to reunify biological families except
where aggravated circumstances are found to exist. 24 Aggravated
circumstances in Pennsylvania include those outlined in ASFA, as
well as the following situations: where the parent's identity or lo-
cation is unknown for three months since the child entered state
19. National Conference of State Legislatures, State Legislation Enacted in Response
to the Adoption and Safe Families Act,
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/cf/term.cfm?stateselect='ALL' (last visited July 30, 2006). See
also Maryann Zavez, The Adoption and Safe Families Act, Implementation and Case Law
with a Focus on 15/22 Month Terminations, 28 MAR. VT. B.J. 37, 38 (2002).
20. Zavez, supra note 19, at 37.
21. N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-b(3)(l)(ii)(C)-(D) (McKinney 2001).
22. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(k)(IV) (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-
292.02(2) (LexisNexis 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020(2)(b) (LexisNexis 2002); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(3)(f) (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21.1(4) (2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 36-1-102(1)(A)(iv), (9) (2002).
23. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6301-6365 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003).
24. Reasonable efforts "require that county agencies provide or ensure the provision of
services, which will preserve family unity whenever possible." ALISA G. FIELD & NINA W.
CHERNOFF, PENNSYLVANIA JUDICIAL DESKBOOK: A GUIDE TO STATUTES, JUDICIAL
DECISIONS AND RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR CASES INVOLVING DEPENDENT CHILDREN IN
PENNSYLVANIA 7 (4th ed. 2004), available at
http://www.jlc.org/File/publications/pajudicialdeskbook.pdf. Specifically, child and welfare
agencies must provide counseling services, parental education services, home-
maker/caretaker services and part-day services. 55 PA. CODE § 3130.35 (2000).
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custody; where the parent has failed to maintain substantial and
continuing contact with the child for a period of six months; where
the parent has committed a violent or sexual crime against any
other child; or where the parent's rights have been involuntarily
terminated with respect to another child.25
Pennsylvania chose to adopt all three federal exceptions to the
15/22 provision without deviation. The compelling reason excep-
tion, however, has not been specifically defined, and Pennsylvania
courts have yet to confront the issue. The Juvenile Law Center in
Philadelphia suggests restricting the compelling reason exception
to situations in which a child of twelve or older does not wish to be
adopted, the family is successfully progressing towards reunifica-
tion, or statutory grounds for parental rights termination clearly
do not exist. 26 There are currently eight statutory grounds for
parental rights termination in Pennsylvania; however, as will be
discussed more fully in the Analysis section below, for incarcer-
ated parents, ASFA's 15/22 provision reacts most dangerously
with only one of them, namely, the parent's failure to perform pa-
rental duties for a period of six months.
27
25. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302.
26. FIELD & CHERNOFF, supra note 24, at 112-13.
27. The remaining statutory grounds are as follows:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the par-
ent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or sub-
sistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be reme-
died by the parent.
(3) The parent is the presumptive but not the natural father of the child.
(4) The child is in the custody of an agency, having been found under such cir-
cumstances that the identity or whereabouts of the parent is unknown and
cannot be ascertained by diligent search and the parent does not claim the
child within three months after the child is found.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or un-
der a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months,
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reason-
able period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the par-
ent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or place-
ment of the child within a reasonable period of time, and termination of the pa-
rental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(6) In the case of a newborn child, the parent knows or has reason to know of
the child's birth, does not reside with the child, has not married the child's
other parent, has failed for a period of four months immediately preceding the
filing of the petition to make reasonable efforts to maintain substantial and
continuing contact with the child and has failed during the same four-month
period to provide substantial financial support for the child.
(7) The parent is the father of a child conceived as a result of a rape or incest.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or un-
der a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 or more months have elapsed
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II. ANALYSIS
A. The Problem Generally: ASFA's Punishment of Incarcerated
Parents
ASFA presumes the unfitness of any parent who allows a child
to remain in foster care past the arbitrary deadline of fifteen
months, without regard to the reason for the child's placement.
Yet, many common problems that are unrelated to parental fit-
ness, such as domestic violence and incarceration, may require
parent-child separation for a greater period of time. 28 Adoption in
these instances may not always be the best alternative, yet ASFA
categorically mandates the filing of a termination petition with
little consideration for individual family situations. The mere
commencement of termination proceedings places the parent in a
dangerous and precarious position, for "[u]nlike other custody pro-
ceedings, [termination] leaves the parent with no right to visit or
communicate with the child, [nor] to participate in, or even to
know about, any important decision affecting the child's religious,
educational, emotional, or physical development." 29
Statistics demonstrate the depth of the problem with respect to
incarcerated parents. According to a report by the Department of
Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics, a majority of all prisoners in
state and federal penitentiaries are parents of minor children. 30
In 1999, the number of children under the age of eighteen with a
parent in prison had increased to nearly 1.5 million.31 Moreover,
the increased presence of minimum sentencing guidelines has led
to overall longer prison terms, with the length of time served by
incarcerated parents averaging 6.5 years in state prison and 8.5
years in federal prison. 32 As a result of these factors, the termina-
from the date of the removal or placement, the conditions which led to the re-
moval or placement of the child continue to exist, and termination of parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a) (2000).
28. Catherine J. Ross, The Tyranny of Time: Vulnerable Children, "Bad" Mothers, and
Statutory Deadlines in Parental Termination Proceedings, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 176,
209 (2004).
29. Katherine A. Hort, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child:
ASFA's Guidelines for the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879,
1910 (2001) (quoting Lassiter v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 39
(1981)).
30. Christopher J. Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Incarcerated Parents and
Their Children 1 (2000), http://www.ojp.usdoj.govfbjs/pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
31. Id. at 2.
32. Id. at 6.
Vol. 45
Racing Against the ASFA Clock
tion of parental rights of incarcerated parents had increased 250
percent by 2002.
33
Compounding the problem is the physical distance typically
separating incarcerated parents from their children. Over sixty
percent of parents in state prisons and over eighty percent of par-
ents in federal prisons are located in facilities greater than one
hundred miles from their homes.34 Mothers are particularly likely
to be placed at a substantial distance from their families due to
the limited number of female correctional facilities across the na-
tion.35 This lack of proximity - combined with the general ab-
sence of state-provided travel and visitation assistance, the par-
ent's dependence on limited, collect telephone calls, and the fre-
quent relocation of foster children - severely restricts the amount
and quality of contact occurring between incarcerated parents and
their children. 36
Maintaining contact is crucial to maintaining the parent-child
relationship, and maintaining the parent-child relationship, in
turn, is crucial to maintaining parental rights. Pennsylvania, like
many other states, provides for the termination of parental rights
on a "permanent neglect" basis, where the parent has failed or
refused to perform parental duties, including maintaining sub-
stantial and meaningful contact with the child, for a period of at
least six months. 37 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has held
that "parental duty requires that the parent not yield to every
problem, but must act affirmatively, with good faith interest and
effort, to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his
or her ability, even in difficult circumstances." 38 As such, "an in-
carcerated parent's responsibilities are not tolled during his incar-
ceration," and "[p]arental rights may not be preserved by waiting
for some more ... convenient time for the performance of parental
duties and responsibilities."
39
It is, therefore, easy to understand how the interplay between
ASFA's 15/22 provision and typical state termination grounds
33. Philip M. Genty, Damage to Family Relationships as a Collateral Consequence of
Parental Incarceration, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1671, 1678 (2003).
34. Mumola, supra note 30, at 5.
35. Genty, supra note 33, at 1673.
36. Day, supra note 9, at 228, 229.
37. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a)(1) (West 2000).
38. In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (holding that incarcerated
father's sporadic letters, birthday cards and gifts were insufficient attempts at maintaining
a relationship with child).
39. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201.
Fall 2006
Duquesne Law Review
poses an almost insurmountable obstacle to the maintenance of
parental rights of incarcerated parents. After fifteen months of
separation from the child, a petition to terminate an incarcerated
parent's rights will be filed, unless one of the limited and highly
discretionary exceptions to the 15/22 provision applies. At the
termination proceeding, the court must determine the existence of
an independent ground for termination, as defined by state law.
40
In many states, grounds for termination exist if the parent has
failed to maintain sufficient contact or a substantial relationship
with the child for a specified period of time, typically three, six or
twelve months. 41 As has already been demonstrated, lengthy
prison sentences, physical distance, and limited visitation and
telephone calls may disrupt parent-child interaction for many
months or years beyond the time period required for termination
of parental rights, and many courts have held that incarceration is
no excuse for such impairment of the parent-child bond.42 Thus,
perhaps one commentator described it best when he summarized:
[W]hen parents go to prison, they can expect to be separated
from their children at great distances for a significant portion
of their children's lives. They can expect to have only limited
personal contact with their children. They can also expect to
have their relationship with their children impaired or, if
40. This is so except in those states where placement in foster care for fifteen of the
most recent twenty-two months is by itself a ground for termination of parental rights. See
supra note 16.
41. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 19.
42. See In re Juvenile Appeal, 446 A.2d 808 (Conn. 1982) (inevitable restraints imposed
by incarceration do not in themselves excuse failure to make use of available though lim-
ited resources for contact with distant child); Stills v. Johnson, 533 S.E.2d 695 (Ga. 2000)
(in termination proceedings, courts may consider whether the incarcerated parent has
made an effort to communicate with the child and, despite imprisonment, maintain a pa-
rental bond in a meaningful, supportive and parental manner); In re J.L.W., 523 N.W.2d
622 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (unavailability of parent as a result of being incarcerated is no
excuse for parent's conduct for purposes of proceedings to terminate parental rights); In re
M.L.K., 804 S.W.2d 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (incarceration does not excuse parent's statu-
tory obligation to provide child with continuing relationship through communication and
visitation, and parental rights may properly be terminated for incarcerated parent's failure
to meet that obligation); In re F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D. 1979) (incarceration alone is not
generally a defense to a claim that a parent has abandoned his child); In re I.R., 544
N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (father's incarceration and residence in drug treatment
facility did not excuse him from maintaining required contact with his children); In re
DeKarri P., 787 A.2d 1170 (R.I. 2001) (failure of incarcerated father to contact agency re-
garding his child, or to visit with or engage in any other meaningful contact with child for
more than six months, justified termination of father's parental rights).
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their children are in foster care, permanently severed through
the termination of their parental rights.
43
One final consequence of ASFA involves its adverse impact on
the parental rights of formerly incarcerated parents. ASFA pro-
vides that reasonable efforts towards reunification with a specific
child are not required if the parent's rights have been previously
terminated as to another child for any reason. 44 Thus, if a par-
ent's rights with respect to one of his children have been termi-
nated while the parent was incarcerated due to the interplay be-
tween the 15/22 provision and the state's "permanent neglect"
termination grounds, the parent's rights with respect to all of his
other children are immediately put in jeopardy. Should any other
of the parent's children subsequently enter the foster care system
for any reason, the state may completely ignore the reasonable
efforts requirement, and a termination proceeding must take place
within thirty days of removal from the home. Thus, ASFA carries
the potential to "punish" incarcerated parents even after their re-
lease from prison by allowing the state to terminate their rights
with respect to subsequent children based only on the tenuous
factors that led to the original termination, i.e., the passage of
time and the complications involved in parenting from prison.
Moreover, the state may do so almost immediately after the child's
removal from the home and without having made any efforts
whatsoever at family reunification. Indeed, ASFA "treats a parent
in this situation the same as if the parent had killed or committed
felony assault [against] the child or another child of the parent or
as if the child had been subject to 'aggravated circumstances' as
defined by state law."4
6
B. ASFA's Disproportionate Effects on Women and Minorities
The War on Drugs has caused the number of women in prison to
multiply steadily since the 1980s, and female offenders now repre-
sent the fastest-growing prison population group in the nation.
46
In 1997, sixty-five percent of women in state prison reported hav-
43. Genty, supra note 33, at 1678-79.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(iii) (2000).
45. Day, supra note 9, at 234.
46. Id. at 223-24. See also Mariely Downey, Losing More than Time: Incarcerated




ing a minor child.47 While the vast majority of mothers in prison
are serving sentences for non-violent crimes, most will serve sig-
nificantly longer than fifteen months for their offenses.
48
Even more disturbing than the sheer number of mothers in
prison is the fact that "seventy to ninety percent of incarcerated
mothers [were] the sole caregivers for their children" prior to be-
ing incarcerated. 49 Conversely, approximately ninety percent of
fathers in both federal and state penal systems report that at least
one of their children resides with the child's non-incarcerated
mother. 50 The greater incidence of single maternal caregiving
over single paternal caregiving has led to significant disparity be-
tween mothers and fathers in the application of ASFA. Because
incarcerated mothers are more likely to have children in foster
care than incarcerated fathers, 51 women have become more vul-
nerable to ASFA's 15/22 provision and thus more susceptible to
losing their parental rights.
A similar concern lies in the disproportionately high rates at
which minorities are incarcerated. Studies show that African-
American and Hispanic children are nine times and three times
more likely, respectively, to have a parent in prison than white
children. 52 In part because of the increasing prison population of
African-American women, African-American children constitute
nearly half of all children in foster care. 53 Thus, the overrepresen-
tation of minorities in prison leads to an overrepresentation of mi-
nority children in foster care, which in turn leads to the increased
vulnerability of minority parents to termination of their parental
rights.
C. Suggestions and Solutions
Many commentators disagree with ASFA's rigidity and insensi-
tivity towards individual family circumstances and instead argue
for greater flexibility and cooperation between the nation's legal
and child welfare systems. Indeed, "[c]riminal justice decisions
are made without regard to the impact upon family members, and
47. Mumola, supra note 30, at 2.
48. Id. at 6-7.
49. Downey, supra note 46, at 45.
50. Day, supra note 9, at 226.
51. Id. Statistics show that "[less than two percent of the children of incarcerated
fathers are in foster care, but ten percent of the children of incarcerated mothers live in a
foster home or other agency placement." Id.
52. Id.
53. Greenaway, supra note 12, at 256.
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child welfare decisions are made without taking into account the
unique situation of incarcerated parents."
54
Suggestions with regard to ASFA include providing for more in-
dividualized determinations of a child's best interests by taking
into account the child's age, the nature of his relationship with the
parent and any alternative placement options that may obviate
the need for adoption. 55 These and other unique factors should be
considered in determining what type of permanency plan would
best provide the child with a stable and loving environment.
Further, the statutory deadline, which has been described as a
result of "political haggling rather than a real showing that fifteen
months should be the outer limit," must be extended to allow par-
ents a better chance at achieving reunification with their chil-
dren. 56 Indeed, termination of a parent's rights upon the expira-
tion of fifteen months does nothing to actually guarantee the child
a permanent home. Thus, because "termination is largely irrele-
vant if the child is not ultimately adopted," the existence of a strict
timeline does not by itself further the goals espoused by ASFA. 
57
With respect to the criminal justice system, ASFA's opponents
believe that judges should be permitted to exercise discretion in
sentencing and to consider such factors as whether the defendant
is the primary caretaker of a child.58 Minimum sentencing guide-
lines should be de-emphasized, and mitigating factors such as
gender, nature of the crime, and family and community ties
should be weighed by the court.59 First-time, non-violent offend-
ers with minor children should be sentenced to drug treatment or
community service programs whenever necessary to prevent their
children from entering the child welfare system. 60 Additionally,
early legal advice with respect to parental rights, preferably soon
after arrest, should be provided to help parents "make more in-
formed decisions and potentially avoid termination."
6 1
54. Genty, supra note 33, at 1681.
55. Ross, supra note 28, at 209.
56. Greenaway, supra note 12, at 263.
57. Hort, supra note 29, at 1907.
58. Downey, supra note 46, at 48.
59. Greenaway, supra note 12, at 261.
60. Id. at 262.
61. Id. at 265. Indeed, "[at] present, with the exception of a few law school clinics and
pilot projects, the majority of incarcerated parents with children in foster care have virtu-
ally no means of obtaining legal representation, unless their case is in litigation pursuant
to which they are produced in court and appointed an attorney." Id. (quoting Martha Rai-
mon of the Incarcerated Mothers Law Project).
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Finally, the solution to the problem could be effectuated legisla-
tively. Currently, two states, Nebraska and Colorado, take paren-
tal incarceration into consideration when applying ASFA's 15/22
provision. Nebraska forbids the state from filing a termination
petition "if the sole factual basis for the petition is that . . .the
parent or parents of the juvenile are incarcerated." 62 Colorado has
added parental incarceration as a fourth exception to the 15/22
provision in that a termination petition need not be filed if the
"child has been in foster care ... due to circumstances beyond the
control of the parent such as incarceration of the parent for a rea-
sonable period of time."63 If all states followed the lead of the
Colorado and Nebraska juvenile laws, the rights of incarcerated
parents would be more adequately protected.
III. CONCLUSION
The current state of child welfare law in the United States al-
lows a parent to easily lose parental rights with respect to a child
if the parent has been incarcerated for more than fifteen months,
regardless of whether the crime committed has anything to do
with the parent's fitness to raise children. The United States Su-
preme Court recognized in Santosky v. Kramer that "until the
State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a
vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural
relationship."64  Incarcerated parents and their children share
this vital interest to no lesser degree simply because of the exis-
tence of a prison sentence, yet ASFA significantly weakens their
familial rights by mandating the initiation of termination proceed-
ings in situations where, given the pre-ASFA focus on reunifica-
tion, such extreme action might not otherwise have taken place.
The interplay between ASFA's 15/22 provision and state law
termination grounds forces incarcerated parents into a dangerous
race against the clock, one in which the odds are tremendously
stacked against them. While reform of the child welfare system
was certainly necessary to cure the problem of "foster care drift,"
the solution has come at the expense of the parental rights of a
large and ever-growing segment of the American population.
When individuals are convicted of crimes, our justice system de-
mands that they relinquish their freedom, privacy, employment,
62. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-292.02(2) (LexisNexis 1998).
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2)(k)(IV) (2000).
64. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 760 (1982).
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and all other comforts and routines of their daily lives in order to
pay back their debt to society. Now, thanks to ASFA, we can add
something far more precious to this list of sacrifices: their chil-
dren.
Emily K. Nicholson

